This paper examines the direction and qualities of the extensive Criminal Justice Sector (CJS) reforms to policing, prisons and probation under the Coalition Government of 2010-2015. First, we examine the ways in which austerity and the 'crime drop' informed the Coalition's overarching approach to CJS reform. Second, we examine in detail the content of policing, prisons and probation policies under the Coalition. Third, we move to explore the key themes emergent in the Coalition's approach to CJS reform and discern a set of continuities with the preceding New Labour administration, as well as a set of contradictions embedded in the qualities of the reforms. In other words, the question remains as to the relative influence of evidence, localism (democracy) and ideology as drivers of CJS policies set against the backdrop of continued austerity.
Introduction
The Criminal Justice System (CJS) in England and Wales went through extensive reform under the Coalition Government of 2010-2015. In this paper, and through the lens of policing, prisons and probation, we set out to identify the direction and qualities of these reforms. The focus on policing, prisons and probation is justified on the basis that interrogation of these major aspects of the CJS should enable the principles underpinning the Coalition's approach to the CJS to be discerned. The paper is structured in the following fashion. First, and recognizing that context serves to shape policy, we examine the ways in which austerity and the 'crime drop' informed the Coalition's approach to the CJS. Second, we progress to examine the content of policing, prisons and probation policies under the Coalition. Third, we move to identify the key themes emergent in the Coalition's approach to the CJS. Finally, we offer some brief conclusions. (Garside and Ford, 2015b) .
Set alongside the 'Austerity agenda', it is important to recognise that the Coalition Government came to power in era in which the overall level of crime (and to an extent public worry about crime), in England and Wales as in other polities, was on a downward trajectory (ONS, 2014a; Tseloni et al., 2010) . Indeed, it continued to fall under the This led Crime Prevention Minister Norman Baker (2014) to state that 'England and Wales are safer than they have been for decades'. That said, there are still an estimated 7.3 million incidents of crime and the rate of decline shows evidence of slowing (ONS, 2014a) . Whether falling police officer numbers (and staff) are responsible for the slowing of the 'crime drop' is uncertain, as the evidence base linking police numbers to crime rates is equivocal. Moreover, whilst the level of traditional or community-centred forms of crime have fallen, new forms of criminal activity such as cyber crime, fraud, terrorism, and the trafficking of people and goods have emerged (Independent Police Commission, 2013) , the scale of which is difficult to quantify.
At this juncture, it is pertinent to identify some factors that have failed to evidence positive or sustained change in line with the 'crime drop' and which, therefore, represent important contextual challenges to the design and delivery of Coalition CJS policy. First, the public is seemingly ignorant of the 'crime drop', though this is nothing new. At the commencement of the New Labour administration (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) , the disjuncture between the 'crime drop', public concern about crime and disorder, as well as falling (though relatively high) confidence in the police, became known as the 'reassurance gap' (Millie, 2014) . In response, a national programme of reassurance policing was developed by New Labour with the clear intention to address public perceptions of crime and confidence in the police, as much as to achieve further reductions in crime. The central mechanisms through which these aims were to be achieved were greater community engagement and policing visibility (Tuffin et al., 2006) . A key contextual challenge for the Coalition, therefore, was how to achieve increased public confidence in the police in the face of declining police numbers. Recent data from the CSEW indicates that whilst public confidence in the police remains high, its upward trajectory (achieved under New Labour) was not maintained throughout the duration of the Coalition Government. Whether this was the result of decreased police numbers is uncertain, though the public report decreased likelihood in seeing a foot patrol officer (ONS, 2014b Hough et al. (2013) found that attitudes to sentencing had changed little since 1996, with most people thinking that the courts were too lenient but underestimating the severity of sentencing practice and expressing relatively lenient sentencing preferences when presented with a hypothetical case. At the time of writing more recent evidence was not available.
Finally, rates of re-offending under the jurisdiction of the CJS in England and Wales are relatively high and have remained so for many years.
Indeed, the proven re-offending rate for adults cautioned, convicted or released from custody has remained at around 25 per cent for the last 10 years (Ministry of Justice, 2015) . For those released from custody the proven re-offending rate is higher, though also stable, being between 45 and 50 per cent over the last ten years (ibid.).
In summary, the 'austerity agenda' has loomed large over the Coalition's approach to the CJS, as it has across all areas of public policy. In short, the CJS has been required to operate in the context of a significantly reduced expenditure profile. The most obvious consequence of this, which in turn has (surely) framed the potential content of CJS policies, has been a reduction in CJS staffing. This trend holds true for policing, prisons and probation. Alongside the 'austerity agenda', CJS policy has been designed and delivered in relation to an apparent longstanding 'crime drop' or rather, as we have argued, in relation to that which has not changed in line with the 'crime drop'.
Thus, a set of seemingly intractable factors have served to frame the design and delivery of the Coalition's CJS policy, these being: concern over the level of public confidence in policing; the high level of imprisonment; and, the high level of the proven rate of re-offending. In this section, we have noted that the qualities of these factors have (seemingly) changed little between 2010 and 2015. However, it is important to recognise, given the time lags associated with policy implementation, that the effects of the Coalition's policies governing the police, prison and probation sectors are yet to take full hold.
Policing, prisons and probation policy under the Coalition
In this section, we survey the key developments in CJS policy in the police, prison and probation sectors between 2010 and 2015.
Policing
The key elements of the Coalition plan to reform policing were presented in a White Paper entitled, 'Policing in the 21st Century' (Home Office, 2010), elements of which became part of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act (2011). In the Ministerial foreword to the White Paper, Teresa May stated that, 'we need to once again reform policing in the country; restoring once more the connection between the police and the people, putting the public back in the driving seat and enabling the police to meet the new crime and antisocial behaviour challenges' (ibid.: 3). The Coalition thus placed the need to enhance police-public relations at the heart of their plans to reform policing. The principle mechanism of this 'reconnect' was the replacement of police authorities with directly elected Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs), who hold the responsibility for creating police and crime plans, commissioning victim and community safety services, and both the appointment and dismissal of Chief Constables. Though there was widespread recognition that the governance of policing was in need of reform, in particular because the inability of police authorities to ensure that local concerns were adequately addressed by their police forces, replacing an authority with an individual with significant power poses the potential to politicize the police, with elected politicians not chief constables setting the strategic direction of police forces (Joyce, 2011) . To date, however, there is limited evidence to suggest that the establishment of PCCs has served to foster enhanced police-public relations. Indeed, the Independent Police Taken as a whole, these changes irrespective of their long-term consequence on recruitment, training and practice have moved to 'diminish the institutional power of the police' (Garside and Ford, 2015a (Hunter et al., 2015) . These tensions are unsurprising, of course, given the other elements of the Coalition's policing reforms.
Prisons and probation
The Coalition's preferred strategy for reducing re-offending whilst also reducing costs was a combination of market testing, outcome focused commissioning strategies and a diversification of the supplier base.
This vision for a 'revolution' in offender management was described in the Conservative Party manifesto in the run up to the 2010 general election: It was subsequently enshrined in the Coalition Agreement:
We will introduce a 'rehabilitation revolution' that will pay independent providers to reduce reoffending, paid for by the savings this new approach will generate within the criminal justice system (HM Government, 2010: 23) .
Early manifestations of this intention were seen in plans to put a substantial number of England and Wales's 119 public sector prisons up for competition. Ultimately, two prisons -Birmingham and Featherstone 2 -were won by G4S, and Serco gained a new contract to continue running Doncaster (Garside and Ford, 2015a) . In 2011, a competition was started inviting bids to run eight public sector prisons and one private sector prison that had come to the end of its contract On the other hand, the competition did identify an alternative model whereby the direct delivery of core custodial functions would be retained by the public sector at considerably lower cost, with ancillary and 'through-the-gate' resettlement services provided through market competition (Grayling 2012) . Garside and Ford (2015a) and to a level that was higher than the national comparison. Webster (2015) argues that: 'These are very disappointing results for the MoJ.
Normally, there would be an expectation of a high level of performance from pilots with such public exposure where the partners had chosen to participate and, indeed, had championed and driven the initiative from the outset'.
In the probation sector an early competition to let contracts to deliver community payback or unpaid work, divided into six regional lots, resulted in only one contract, for London, being let. At the same time a competition for 'innovation pilots' was launched. One lot in the bidding round was designed to find innovative approaches to tackling the re- 
The Coalition's approach to the CJS
In this section we set out some of the key themes, and their contradictions, that emerged in the Coalition Government's approach to the CJS, these being: devolution and centralism; marketization with a growing emphasis on payment by results; politicisation and depoliticisation; and, evidence-based policy.
The Coalition's approach to the CJS has been coloured by moves to both devolve and centralise decision-making (Garside and Ford, 2015a) , though it has lacked consistency of emphasis and achievement. In policing, the introduction of PCCs represents a move to greater localism, whereas the introduction of a National Crime
Agency and the establishment of the College of Policing (inclusive of the WWCCR) are indicative of enhanced centralisation. In the prisons sector, an attempt to orchestrate the devolvement of core provision (via privatisation) failed and was superseded by the selective outsourcing of estate management (ibid.). In the probation sector, the trajectory to devolve commissioning to Probation Trusts was superseded by their abolition and the creation of a National Probation Service. At the same time, there has been a move to devolve resettlement services to CRCs (ibid.; Fox and Grimm, 2015) . In overview, we can interpret the direction of travel to be towards a greater centralisation of control. CJS policy has, however, included elements that might be claimed to enhance the sensitivity of service provision to local demands. In stating this, it is also clear that the mechanisms deployed to achieve this have been imbued by a further set of political imperatives (see below). Moreover, the qualities of the mechanisms deployed have impacted upon the outcomes achieved.
The Justice Reinvestment pilots represent an illustrative case in point.
On the one hand, they represent a clear intention to decentralise and empower local delivery agencies. However, the system of metrics and payment regimes established by the Ministry of Justice have been critiqued as overly complex and providing insufficient incentive to encourage local agencies to invest or to make substantial changes to practice that were not already being planned (Wong et al., 2013) .
A second major theme of the Coalition's approach to the CJS has been marketization. The use of non-public sector providers in the CJS was, of course, established prior the Coalition Government. However, and between 2010 and 2015, there was clear endeavour to enlarge the role of markets as a key driver of reform. As Garside and Ford (2015a) note, there were variations in how this approach to marketization was implemented both within and across sectors. Within the prison sector, putting individual prisons out to competition ('vertical commissioning') was superseded by a model in which whole service categories, such as buildings and estate management, were put out to tender ('horizontal commissioning'). In the probation sector, an initial decision to devolve commissioning to Probation Trusts was overturned in their abolition.
The creation of a National Probation Service effectively served to centralise macro-level commissioning. It is worth noting that this trend evidences distinction from other areas of the public sector. In health and social care, for example, there has been a clear trend towards decentralised place-based or even micro-level commissioning .
Another aspect of the marketization of the CJS has been the increased Aspects of the Coalition's approach to CJS reform exhibit similar tendencies. Thus, the creation of PCCs and CRCs can, on the one hand, be seen as a move to further depoliticise CJS reform at the national level. PCCs and CRCs serve to transfer important aspects of accountability and service delivery beyond the day-to-day control of
Ministers and, arguably of parliament, though there is distinct nuance between these initiatives. In the case of PCCs (as noted earlier), this shift in the locus of accountability, effectively serves to politicize policing at the local level (Joyce, 2011) . In the case of CRCs, the size and duration of the contracts involved mean that reversing this policy would be extremely difficult for any future government because of the penalty payments that would be incurred. On the other hand, the creation of markets within the CJS can be seen as deeply ideological, the logical extreme of which might be the creation of tradeable assets and a market in Social Impact Bonds (Mulgan et al.,2010) .
A final theme that holds place in the Coalition's approach to the CJS is the promotion of evidence-based policy. New Labour, at least initially, championed the importance of evidence-based policy (Cabinet Office, 1999) to modern, professional policy-making (Bullock et al., 2001) . For Bannister and Hardill (2015: 3), this marked a 'political imperative to move beyond ideological assertion to pragmatic considerations of 'evidence ' and 'what works'', and Diamond (2013) the WWCCR can be seen as an endeavour to deliver efficiency savings through more effective practice. As indicated earlier, however, there are clear tensions between the emphasis on evidence-based approaches and the endeavour to promote increased sensitivity to local public accountability (Hunter et al., 2015) . More broadly, the various reforms to the CJS described in this paper were not advanced upon robust evidential foundations. The Coalition did impact, however, upon the types of evidence to be given primacy in policy-making.
Under PbR, service providers are challenged to deliver a set of specified outcomes in order to receive payment, effectively serving to pre-determine the range of evidence sought irrespective of it availability or quality (Fox and Albertson, 2012) .
Conclusion: Continuities and Contradictions
Reflecting on the Coalition's approach to the CJS it is possible to identify a set of continuities with the preceding New Labour administration and a set of contradictions embedded in the emergent themes of that reform. Austerity and the persistence of certain CJS problems (irrespective of the crime drop) also served to frame the Coalition's CJS agenda and the vigour with which it was pursued. 
